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MIAMI .LAW QUARTERLY
poor law.2' It is submitted that in the present case the court's holding
merely perpetuated formality of procedural requirements in failing to look
behind the nominal defendant to the real party in interest. In such cases,
in the absence of amendments to the rules, the court should, as the dissent
22
suggests and as many federal courts have done,23 recognize the United States
as the real party in interest and not allow the action to abate for failure of
proper substitution. In any event, effort should be made to alleviate a situ-
ation in which a party to an action must correct his adversary's error.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-DOMESTIC RELATIONS-COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON DIVORCE DECREE BY STRANGER TO ACTION
After the death of IV-, H married \V-,, and they established their
residence in New York. In August 1941, V-, obtained a divorce from H in
a Florida proceeding,' although the undisputed facts show that she did not
comply with the jurisdictional 90-day residence requirement.2 In 1944, H
married W-,, and in 1945 H died, leaving a will in which he gave his entire
estate to his daughter by W-,. After probate of the will, V-, filed notice
of her election to take the statutory one-third share of the estate." This
election was contested by H's legatee, the daughter by W-,, who argued
that \V-,'s Florida divorce from H was invalid and therefore W-, could
claim no status as H's surviving spouse. The New York Surrogate 4 ruled in
favor of W-,, and that ruling was unanimously upheld by the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court. The New York Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the Florida judgment finding jurisdiction to decree
the divorce bound only the parties themselves and, as the court construed
the Florida cases to allow the daughter to attack the decree collaterally in
Florida, it decided she should be equally free to do so in New York. On
certiorari, held, Florida divorce against husband rendered after his general
appearance and contest on merits is not subject to collateral attack on juris-
dictional grounds by his daughter in Florida, and is not subject to collateral
21. 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 510 (The author says the rule for substitution
is needless formality and substitution should be put on a flexible basis. The rule is a
substantial restatement of a statute that was only partially sound in its approach to the
problem.).
22. See note 17 supra.
23. See note 15 supra.
I. In this proceeding, H had appeared by attorney and interposed an answer denying
the wrongful acts but not questioning the allegations as to residence in Florida.
2. FLA. STAT. § 65.02 (1949). (Thfis has been construed to require residence for
the 90 days immediately preceding the filing date,); Curley v. Curley, 144 Fla. 728, 198
So. 584 (1940). In the instant ease \\-, arrived in Florida from New York in June, and
filed a bill of complaint on July 29.
3. Pursuant to N.Y. DECHDFNT ESTATE LAw § 18.
4. Who heard the cause under the provisions of N.Y. SURROGATE'S COURT ACT
§ 145-a.
5. In re Johnson's Estate, 301 N.Y. 13, 92 N.E.2d 44 (1950).
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attack by her in New York after his death. Johnson v. Muelberger, 71 Sup.
Ct. 474 (1951).
The celebrated case of Sherrer v. Sherrer" decided that a state, by virtuc
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause7 and congressional enactment there-
under,8 must give full faith and credit to an out-of-state divorce decree by
barring either party to that divorce who has been personally served or who
has entered a personal appearance" from collaterally attacking the decree,
where the decree cannot be so attacked in the courts of the rendering state.
The question left open in Sherrer is answered in the instant case by applying
the rule in Sherrer to third persons. or strangers. to the decree. Thus, the
real question at issue in the instant case is whether or not Florida law would
permit the daughter in this action to collaterally attack the Florida divorce
decree rendered against her father. The New York Court of Appeals realized
that that was the real question at issue, although it answered the question
affirmatively.10
It must be conceded, at the outset, that there is no Florida case directly
on point. One authority on Florida divorce practice" anticipated the ques-
tion here decided but would make no prediction as to its final solution.'2
However, the case'3j on which the U.S. Supreme Court relied most heavily
in concluding that the daughter in the instant case could not collaterally
attack the decree in Florida was decided too late for incorporation (even by
reference) in Mr. Carson's work,4 and probably was not before the New
York court' either. There, a wife sought to attack collaterally the Florida
divorce decree of her husband and his former wife, on the ground that,
since the husband and former wife were foreign nationals and the former
wife, petitioner in the divorce action, was in the U.S. on a temporary vis-
itor's visa, the rendering court did not and could not acquire jurisdiction of
the parties, it being contended that the former wife could not have acquired
6. 334 U.S. 343 (1949). See Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
7. U.S. CoNST. Art. IV, § 1.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1946).
9. Where these conditions are not met, as, for example, where the defendant in a
divorce action has not been personally served or has not entered a personal appearance,
the decree is subject to collateral attack elsewhere. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U.S. 226 (1945) (Sometimes referred to as Williams II).
10. In re Johnson's Estate, supra note 5, at 48: " . the petitioner, a stranger to
the Florida divorce action and decree, could successfully challenge the validity of that
decree in collateral proceedings in the courts of Florida by produciug proof of fraudulent
circumstances under which it was obtained. See State ex rel. Willys v. Chillingsworth, 124
Fla. 274, 278-279, 168 So. 249. To hold that she could not do likewise in this state
would be to give to the Florida decree a More conclusive effect here that it would have
in Florida."
11. CARSON, FLORIDA LAw oi 'rHE FAMILY, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (1950).
12. Id. at 625: ". . the qtlestion not decided is whether the estoppel of the parties
would be held thereafter to be binding upon their heirs or the heirs of either of them.
The question may become important by reason of the fact that almost all divorces nowa-
days are by agreement."
13. de Marigny v. de Marigny, 43 So.2d 442 (Dec. 1949).
14. See note 11 supra.
15. See note 5 supra.
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a legally sufficient residence in Florida for the purpose of securing a divorce.
The Florida Supreme Court held that where a final divorce decree was
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and it appeared on the record
to be valid in every respect, one who had not been a party to the divorce
action could not maintain an independent bill in equity to have it adjudi-
cated that the decree was invalid on jurisdictional grounds dehors the record,
nor could such a person be permitted to represent the state in an effort to
redress an alleged fraud on the court."' The court quoted"7 with approval
the excerpt set out below from the pages of a well-known authority on
judgments.'8
The New York Court"' relied essentially on State ex rel. Willys v. Chil-
lingsworth20 in arriving at the conclusion that the daughter here could col-
laterally attack the divorce decree in Florida. But that case was a suggestion
for writ of prohibition filed in the Florida Supreme Court to prohibit a
lower court of record proceeding on a complaint filed by Willys' daughter
that her stepmother's divorce from a former husband was fraudulently ob-
tained. Therefore, it was alleged, her stepmother's marriage to Willys was
void and the stepmother had no right or interest as widow in Willys' estate.
The writ of prohibition was granted because of improper venue of the com-
plaint, but the opinion intimated that a daughter, as heir, could represent
a deceased father in an attack on a stepmother's former divorce.2 t IHJowever,
the U.S. Supreme Court, in the instant case, correctly pointed out that this
observation was not directed at circumstances where res judicata could bind
the parent. That is, neither Willys nor his daughter was a party to the
stepmother's divorce proceedings. The concurring opinion in the WXIillys
case -highlights the true significance of that decision?2
16. de Marigny v. de Marigny, supra note 13, at 445.
17. Id. at 447.
18. 1 FREEMAN ON J UDCMENTS § 319 (1925): "It is only those strangers who, if
the judgment were given fil credit and effect would be prejudiced in regard to some pre-
existing right, that are permitted to impeach the judgment. Being neither parties to the
action, nor entitled to manage the cause, nor appeal from the judgment, they are by law
allowed to impeach it whenever it is attempted to be enforced against them so as to ef-
fect rights or interests acquired prior to its rendition." (Italics by court).
19. See note 5 supra.
20. 124 Fla. 274, 168 So. 249 (1936).
21. Id. at 278, 168 So. at 251: "The rule is settled in this state that respondent,
being heir to her father's estate, has a right to question the validity of his marriage to
petitioner."
22. Id. at 279, 168 So. at 251, per Davis, J.: "In this case the record shows that
the challenged divorce decree of the Dade county circuit court was rendered on personal
service, with both parties before the court, and upon proper allegations and proof showing
the jurisdiction of that court to proceed and to grant a decree of divorce.
"The premise upon which suit attacking that decree in Palm Beach county circuit
court has been filed is that the resultant decree of the circuit court of Dade County is
void, as distinguished from voidable, because of perjured testimony offered before the
Dade county circuit court on the subject of its jurisdiction.
"However, that premise is fallacious, as a decree rendered by a court of chancery in
this state, which is a court of general jurisdiction, cannot be collaterally attacked as void
when the allegations of the pleadings and the proof offered and accepted by such chancery
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Although the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in Haddock v. Haddock2
("I do not suppose that civilization will come to an end whichever way
this case is decided."), is not without applicability here,2 4 it is rather un-
deniable that the decision in the instant case does reflect a public policy
based upon the broad premise that decisions of proper courts in one state
shall not be challenged lightly in courts of a sister state. Although the lay-
man cannot ordinarily appreciate the significance of legal terminology, such
as res judicata, it is no doubt true that he subscribes to the fundamental
concept that what has once been decided should be laid at rest. In the
field of divorce law particularly, our standards of public morality demand
that a court shall not declare a marital relationship meretricious ab initio
merely because it finds a sister state court's finding on jurisdiction erroneous,
under circumstances such as are presented in the instant case. 25
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - LIBEL - PUBLICATION OF
SUBVERSIVE LIST - DAMAGE: DIRECT OR INDIRECT?*
Pursuant to an Executive Order,' the Attorney General compiled a
list of organizations that he found to be subversive. This list was distributed
to the heads of all executive departments and subsequently released to the
court is sufficient, on the face of the record, to support the jurisdictional finding upon
which the final decree was rendered.
"In Bryant v. Bryant, 101 Fla. 179, 133 So. 635, 636, cited with approval and fol-
lowed in Cone v. Cone, 102 Fla. 793, 136 So. 466, this proposition was distinctly held:
'Where the jurisdiction of a court of equity has been wrongfully invoked and a final
decree obtained upon false allegations of jurisdictional facts * * * the decree was voidable
but not void, because the lack of jurisdiction only appears from matters dehors the record
[when] alleged by the defendant, * * * [but] not on the fact of the record of the
original proceeding when final decree was entered.'
"In Florida, divorce cases are chancery cases the same as foreclosure cases and the
like. Ecclesiastical court doctrines which sustain almost any kind of an excuse to uproot
a divorce decree because of moral, as distinguished from legal, considerations, have no
place in Florida law, in my judgment."
23. 201 U.S. 562, 628 (1906).
24. Nor did Mr. justice Frankfurter think it inapplicable in the Sherrer case, as
witness his reference thereto in his dissenting opinion, supra note 6, at 356.
25. "If the appellant-petitioner may maintain the instant suit it would be possible
for any party to a fraudulent divorce decree, which is valid on the face of the record, to
conspire with another person to enter into a marriage with him or her with the sole
purpose in mind of having said spouse thereafter bring a proceeding to impeach the
divorce decree and thus accomplish indirectly, by means of such conspiracy and fraud,
that which could not be accomplished directly. It is our conclusion that the lesser evil
would result from a judgment unfavorable to the appellant-petitioner's position and that
decency, good morals and the welfare of society would be more nearly satisfied by such rul-
ing. Certainly, such a decision would be less inimicable to the interests of our citizens as a
whole than one favorable to the appellant-petitioner for the latter, in our opinion, could
lead to 'widespread social disorder! See Shea v. Shea, 270 App. Div. 527, 60 N.Y.S.2d
823, at page 827." de Marigny v. de Marigny, supra, note 13, at 446-447.
*Editor's note: Since this casenote went to press, the instant case was reversed and
remanded by the Sup. Ct. to allow the plaintiff the constitutional right of its day in court.
19 U. S. LAw WEE14.
1. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 FED. RE(. 1935 (1947); 53 STAT. 1148 (1939), 5
U.S.C.A. § 18j (Supp. 1950) (Hatch Political Activity Act).
For collateral readings on the Hatch Act see: Donovan and Jones, Program for a
